1. C. Lampin-Maillet, A. Mantzavelas, L. Galiana, M. Jappiot, M. Long, et al.. Wildland urbaninterfaces, fire behaviour and vulnerability: characterization, mapping and assessment. To-wards Integrated Fire Management - Outcomes of the European Project Fire Paradox, Lampin-Maillet,C., European Forest Institute, 21 p., 2010. (18) (PDF) Wildland urban interfaces, fire behaviour and vulnerability: characterization, mapping and assessment. Available from:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280857793_Wildland_urban_interfaces_fire_behaviour_and_vulnerability_characterization_mapping_and_assessment [accessed Aug 31 2021].
Abstract
Assessing the risk of forest fires in wildland urban interfaces (WUIs) is crucial for wildfire prevention and land management. With the goal of developing an efficient management of fire risk in wildland urban interfaces in European Mediterranean countries, this chapter recommends methods and advices for the identification, characterization and mapping of WUIs as well as for the assessment of the fire hazard, the vulnerability and the damage potential of these areas. These tools are the result of scientific researches and fruit of past experiences analysis. More over this chapter insists on the interest of providing wildland urban interface maps in the purpose to know the real extent of theses areas and to manage their development. It briefly presents the steps of a method to identify, to characterize and to map WUI in European Mediterranean countries combining relevant criteria which are connected to the spatial organization of inhabitant dwellings and the structure of the vegetation. A WUI' typology is established. The method can be easily applied by land agencies or managers easily and is suitable both in large areas or landscape level (small scales) and in local conditions (large scale). Because of their high vulnerability, ignition probability and combustibility, it is important and efficient to focus risk assessment in the WUIs. The chapter brings a method to assess and to map fire hazard levels and vulnerability levels according to WUIs and their environment. Introducing the risk of fire and particularly the vulnerability of the territory with such maps is a way to make the inhabitants becoming aware of fire risk in WUI. This will globally decrease the risk of fire either by reducing fire propagation with biomass removal and or by reducing fire ignition probability together with less carelessness. Accomplishing this goal is strictly related to the designation of suitable prevention messages and preventive actions which can be different according to WUI types.
2. Vigna, I.; Besana, A.; Comino, E.; Pezzoli, A. Application of the Socio-Ecological System Framework to Forest Fire Risk Management: A Systematic Literature Review. Sustainability 2021, 13, 2121. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13042121
Abstract
Although increasing concern about climate change has raised awareness of the fundamental role of forest ecosystems, forests are threatened by human-induced impacts worldwide. Among them, wildfire risk is clearly the result of the interaction between human activities, ecological domains, and climate. However, a clear understanding of these interactions is still needed both at the global and local levels. Numerous studies have proven the validity of the socioecological system (SES) approach in addressing this kind of interdisciplinary issue. Therefore, a systematic review of the existing literature on the application of SES frameworks to forest ecosystems is carried out, with a specific focus on wildfire risk management. The results demonstrate the existence of different methodological approaches that can be grouped into seven main categories, which range from qualitative analysis to quantitative spatially explicit investigations. The strengths and limitations of the approaches are discussed, with a specific reference to the geographical setting of the works. The research suggests the importance of local community involvement and local knowledge consideration in wildfire risk management. This review provides a starting point for future research on forest SES and a supporting tool for the development of a sustainable wildfire risk adaptation and mitigation strategy.
3. Pais, S.; Aquilué, N.; Campos, J.; Sil, Â.; Marcos, B.; Martínez-Freiría, F.; Domínguez, J.; Brotons, L.; Honrado, J.P.; Regos, A. Mountain Farmland Protection and Fire-Smart Management Jointly Reduce Fire Hazard and Enhance Biodiversity and Carbon Sequestration. Ecosyst. Serv. 2020, 44, 101143. [doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2020.101143
Abstract
The environmental and socio-economic impacts of wildfires are foreseen to increase across southern Europe over the next decades regardless of increasing resources allocated for fire suppression. This study aims to identify fire-smart management strategies that promote wildfire hazard reduction, climate regulation ecosystem service and biodiversity conservation. Here we simulate fire-landscape dynamics, carbon sequestration and species distribution (116 vertebrates) in the Transboundary Biosphere Reserve Gerês-Xurés (NW Iberia). We envisage 11 scenarios resulting from different management strategies following four storylines: Business-as-usual (BAU), expansion of High Nature Value farmlands (HNVf), Fire-Smart forest management, and HNVf plus Fire-Smart. Fire-landscape simulations reveal an increase of up to 25% of annual burned area. HNVf areas may counterbalance this increasing fire impact, especially when combined with fire-smart strategies (reductions of up to 50% between 2031 and 2050). The Fire-Smart and BAU scenarios attain the highest estimates for total carbon sequestered. A decrease in habitat suitability (around 18%) since 1990 is predicted for species of conservation concern under the BAU scenario, while HNVf would support the best outcomes in terms of conservation. Our study highlights the benefits of integrating fire hazard control, ecosystem service supply and biodiversity conservation to inform better decision-making in mountain landscapes of Southern Europe.
4. Oliveira, S.; Zêzere, J.L. Assessing the Biophysical and Social Drivers of Burned Area Distribution at the Local Scale. J. Environ. Manag. 2020, 264, 110449. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301479720303832?via%3Dihub
Abstract
Understanding the characteristics of wildfire-affected communities and the importance of particular factors of different dimensions, is paramount to improve prevention and mitigation strategies, tailored to people's needs and abilities. In this study, we explored different combinations of biophysical and social factors to characterize wildfire-affected areas in Portugal. By means of machine-learning methods based on classification trees, we assessed the predictive ability of various models to discriminate different levels of wildfire incidence at the local scale. The model with the best performance included a reduced set of both biophysical and social variables and we found that, oveall, the exclusion of specific variables improved prediction rates of group classification. The most important variables were related to landcover; the civil parishes covered by more than 20% of shrublands were more fire-prone, whereas those parishes with at least 40% of agricultural land were less affected by wildfires. Regarding social variables, the most-affected parishes showed a lower proportion of foreign residents and lower purchasing power, conditions likely associated with the socioeconomic context of inland low-density rural areas, where rural abandonment, depopulation and ageing trends have been observed in the last decades. Further research is needed to investigate how other particular parameters representing the social context, and its evolution, can be integrated in wildfire occurrence modelling, and how these interact with the biophysical conditions over time.
5. Kefalas, G.; Kalogirou, S.; Poirazidis, K.; Lorilla, R.S. Landscape Transition in Mediterranean Islands: The Case of Ionian Islands, Greece 1985–2015. Landsc. Urban Plan. 2019, 191, 103641. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0169204619306917?via%3Dihub
Abstract
Mediterranean islands are heterogeneous and dynamic landscapes resulting from complex interactions between natural and anthropogenic processes that contribute to their high biodiversity, and aesthetic and cultural value. Such islands are considered susceptible to environmental changes that, in combination with intense human activities, could harm local ecosystems and the supply of important goods and services. Thus, it is important to monitor changes to land use/land cover (LULC) to identify the underlying drivers for effective sustainable management. This study aimed to interpret the main LULC transitions over a 30-year period across the Ionian Islands in western Greece. Eleven socioeconomic and environmental variables were analyzed in relation to five main LULC transitions using global (GLM) and local (GWR) modeling approaches. LULC changes, which have a clear impact on the structure of the Ionian landscape, primarily occurred in the natural vegetation zone and the agricultural zone, while urbanization transition was limited. Each change was correlated with a specific combination of environmental and socioeconomic factors of varying magnitude within the island complexes. In particular, geomorphological, bioclimatic, and natural disaster variables were related to changes to the natural vegetation zone. In comparison, changes to the agricultural zone were linked with socioeconomic variables and specific environmental characteristics. In parallel, urbanization was mainly driven by increasing population size and increasing number of tourist accommodations. In conclusion, this study showed that the combined framework of geospatial analytics (statistical, spatial, and GIS) and remote sensing techniques constitute a useful tool for suggesting possible factors related to landscape change at both local and regional scales.
6. N W Arnell et al The effect of climate change on indicators of fire danger in the UK 2021 Environ. Res. Lett. 16 044027 https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abd9f2
Abstract
The UK is vulnerable to wildfire, and vulnerability is likely to increase due to climate change. Whilst the risk is small compared with many other countries, recent fires have raised awareness and highlighted the potential for environmental damage and loss of property and key infrastructure. Most UK wildfires are a result of inadvertent or deliberate human action, but the environmental conditions depend on antecedent and current weather. This paper presents projections of the effects of climate change on UK wildfire danger, using a version of an operational fire danger model, UKCP18 climate projections representing low and high emissions, and several indicators of fire danger. Fire danger will increase across the whole of the UK, but the extent and variability in change varies with indicator. The absolute danger now and into the future is greatest in the south and east (the average number of danger days increases 3–4 times by the 2080s), but danger increases further north from a lower base. The variation in change across the UK for indicators based on absolute thresholds is determined by how often those thresholds are exceeded now, whilst the (lesser) variability in percentile-based indicators reflects variability in the projected change in climate. Half of the increase in danger is due to increased temperature, and most of the rest is due to projected reductions in relative humidity. Uncertainty in the magnitude of the change is due to uncertainty in changes in temperature, relative humidity, and rainfall, and there is a large difference between two of the UKCP18 climate model ensembles. Reducing emissions to levels consistent with achieving international climate policy targets significantly reduces, but does not eliminate, the increase in fire danger. The results imply that greater attention needs to be given to wildfire danger in both emergency and spatial planning, and in the development of guidelines for activities that may trigger fires. They suggest the need for the development of a fire danger system more tailored to UK conditions, and the combination of fire danger modelling with projections of --sources of ignition to better estimate the change in wildfire risk.
7. Ana Novo 1, Noelia Fariñas-Álvarez, Joaquín Martínez-Sánchez, Higinio González-Jorge, José María Fernández-Alonso and Henrique Lorenzo Mapping Forest Fire Risk—A Case Study in Galicia (Spain)
Remote Sens. 2020, 12, 3705; doi:10.3390/rs12223705 www.mdpi.com/journal/remotesensing
Abstract: The optimization of forest management in roadsides is a necessary task in terms of wildfire prevention in order to mitigate their e_ects. Forest fire risk assessment identifies high-risk locations, while providing a decision-making support about vegetation management for firefighting. In this study, nine relevant parameters: elevation, slope, aspect, road distance, settlement distance, fuel model types, normalized di_erence vegetation index (NDVI), fire weather index (FWI), and historical fire regimes, were considered as indicators of the likelihood of a forest fire occurrence. The parameters were grouped in five categories: topography, vegetation, FWI, historical fire regimes, and anthropogenic issues. This paper presents a novel approach to forest fire risk mapping theclassification of vegetation in fuel model types based on the analysis of light detection and ranging
(LiDAR) was incorporated. The criteria weights that lead to fire risk were computed by the analytic
hierarchy process (AHP) and applied to two datasets located in NW Spain. Results show that
approximately 50% of the study area A and 65% of the study area B are characterized as a 3-moderate
fire risk zone. The methodology presented in this study will allow road managers to determine
appropriate vegetation measures with regards to fire risk. The automation of this methodology is
transferable to other regions for forest prevention planning and fire mitigation.
8. Benaroch, M., Lichtenstein, Y., & Robinson, K. (2006). Real options in information technology risk management: An empirical validation of risk-option relationships. MIS Quarterly, 30(4), 827–864. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25148756?casa_token=aPoNGZbVmvUAAAAA%3AbinbjA9uIcKorrfT_PM2fxwdPhBlrnyo9XxMjhkasGTyICV8GfQpuYXJA27iUsG1vSW33RTkncTudZ9yCHoJ6NsIFp8YLcxb2xIg6mymWdzkCCgMzHWwSg&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
Abstract
Recently, an option-based risk management (OBRiM) framework has been proposed to control risk and maximize value in information technology investment decisions. While the framework is prescriptive in nature, its core logic rests on a set of normative risk-option mappings for choosing which particular real options to embed in an investment in order to control specific risks. This study tests empirically whether these mappings are observed in practice. The research site is a large Irish financial services organization with well established IT risk management practices not tied to any real options framework. Our analysis of the risk management plans developed for a broad portfolio of 50 IT investments finds ample empirical support for OBRiM's risk-option mappings. This shows that IT managers follow the logic of option-based risk management, although purely based on intuition. Unfortunately, reliance on this logic based on intuition alone could lead to suboptimal or counterproductive risk management practices. We therefore argue that managerial intuition ought to be supplemented with the use of formal real option models, which allow for better quantitative insights into which risk mitigations to pursue and combine in order to effectively address the risks most worth controlling.
9. Renn, O., Klinke, A., & Van Asselt, M. (2011). Coping with complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity in risk governance: A synthesis. Ambio, 40, 231–246. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-010-0134-0
Abstract
The term governance describes the multitude of actors and processes that lead to collectively binding decisions. The term risk governance translates the core principles of governance to the context of risk-related policy making. We aim to delineate some basic lessons from the insights of the other articles in this special issue for our understanding of risk governance. Risk governance provides a conceptual as well as normative basis for how to cope with uncertain, complex and/or ambiguous risks. We propose to synthesize the breadth of the articles in this special issue by suggesting some changes to the risk governance framework proposed by the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) and adding some insights to its analytical and normative implications.
10. Van Asselt, M. B. A., & Renn, O. (2011). Risk governance. Journal of Risk Research, 14(4), 431–449. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2011.553730
Abstract
The term ‘governance’ has been used in political science to describe the multitude of actors and processes that lead to collective binding decisions. The term ‘risk governance’ involves the translation of the substance and core principles of governance to the context of risk‐related decision‐making. Does it involve a major change on how risks are conceptualized, managed, and communicated, or it is just a new fashion? In this paper, we aim to delineate the genesis and analytical scope of risk governance. In our view, risk governance pertains to the various ways in which many actors, individuals, and institutions, public and private, deal with risks surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity. It emphasizes that not all risks are simple; they cannot be calculated as a function of probability and effect. It is more than a descriptive shorthand for a complex, interacting network in which collective binding decisions are taken around a particular set of societal issues. The ambition is that risk governance provides a conceptual as well as normative basis for how to deal responsibly with uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks in particular. We propose to synthesize the body of scholarly ideas and proposals on the governance of systemic risks in a set of principles: the communication and inclusion principle, the integration principle, and the reflection principle. This set of principles should be read as a synthesis of what needs to be seriously considered in organizing structures and processes to govern risks.
11. Wachinger, G., Renn, O., Begg, C., & Kuhlicke, C. (2013). The risk perception paradox—Implications for governance and communication of natural hazards. Risk Analysis, 33(6), 1049–1065. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2012.01942.x
Abstract
This article reviews the main insights from selected literature on risk perception, particularly in connection with natural hazards. It includes numerous case studies on perception and social behavior dealing with floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcano eruptions, wild fires, and landslides. The review reveals that personal experience of a natural hazard and trust—or lack of trust—in authorities and experts have the most substantial impact on risk perception. Cultural and individual factors such as media coverage, age, gender, education, income, social status, and others do not play such an important role but act as mediators or amplifiers of the main causal connections between experience, trust, perception, and preparedness to take protective actions. When analyzing the factors of experience and trust on risk perception and on the likeliness of individuals to take preparedness action, the review found that a risk perception paradox exists in that it is assumed that high risk perception will lead to personal preparedness and, in the next step, to risk mitigation behavior. However, this is not necessarily true. In fact, the opposite can occur if individuals with high risk perception still choose not to personally prepare themselves in the face of a natural hazard. Therefore, based on the results of the review, this article offers three explanations suggesting why this paradox might occur. These findings have implications for future risk governance and communication as well as for the willingness of individuals to invest in risk preparedness or risk mitigation actions.
12. Wisner, B., Gaillard, J. C., & Kelman, I. (2012). Framing disaster: Theories and stories seeking to understand hazards, vulnerability and risk. In B. Wisner, J. C. Gaillard, & I. Kelman (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of hazards and disaster risk reduction (pp. 18–33). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203844236.ch3
13. Lemos, M. C., Klenk, N., Kirchhoff, C. J., Morrison, T., Bremer, S., Fischer, A. P., Soares, M. B., Torres, R. R., & Olwoch, J. M. (2020). Grand challenges for climate risk management. Frontiers in Climate, 2, 1–4. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2020.605206
Abstract
The sudden and devastating crisis of the 2020 global pandemic put risk management front and center globally. Many analysts have already highlighted both the commonalities with, and interactions between, the COVID pandemic and climate change. They have also expressed the hope that what we learn about managing risks during the pandemic can help us manage risks related to climate change. Climate change impact shares many characteristics with the pandemic, including its global reach, the way it disproportionately and unfairly affects the poor and the vulnerable, and its non-linear and uncertain character. Both crises also engender the need to address the structural causes of vulnerability at all scales through transformational socioeconomic and political change that improves resilience to all impacts (see for example Ord, 2020). The compound and complex challenge of dealing with multiple stressors at the same time, such as climate change and public health, highlight the need for scholars of risk to think harder about how to both accelerate and scale up the role of scientific knowledge in influencing and informing decisions on the ground.
14. Galaz, V., Tallberg, J., Boin, A., Ituarte-lima, C., Hey, E., Olsson, P., & Westley, F. (2017). Global governance dimensions of globally networked risks: The state of the art in social science research. Risks, Hazards and Crisis in Public Policy, 8(1), 4–27.
Abstract
Global risks are now increasingly being perceived as networked, and likely to result in large-scale, propagating failures and crises that transgress national boundaries and societal sectors. These so called “globally networked risks” pose fundamental challenges to global governance institutions. A growing literature explores the nature of these globally networked or “systemic” risks. While this research has taught us much about the anatomy of these risks, it has consistently failed to integrate insights from the wider social sciences. This is problematic since the prescriptions that result from these efforts flow from naїve assumptions about the way real-world state and non-state actors behave in the international arena. This leaves serious gaps in our understanding of whether networked environmental risks at all can be governed. The following essay brings together decades of research by different disciplines in the social sciences, and identifies five multi-disciplinary key insights that can inform global approaches to governing these. These insights include the influence of international institutions; the dynamics and effect of international norms and legal mechanisms; the need for international institutions to cope with transboundary and cross-sectoral crises; the role of innovation as a strategy to handle unpredictable global risks; and the necessity to address legitimacy issues.
15. Schäfer, M. S., & Neill, S. O. (2017). Frame analysis in climate change communication. In Oxford research encyclopedia of climate science. Oxford UniversIty Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228620.013.487
Abstract
Framing—selecting certain aspects of a given issue and making them more salient in communication in order to “frame” the issue in a specific way—is a key concept in the study of communication. At the same time, it has been used very differently in scholarship, leading some to declare it a “fractured paradigm,” or an idea whose usefulness has expired. In studies of climate change communication, frame analyses have been used numerous times and in various ways, from formal framing approaches (e.g., episodic vs. thematic framing) to topical frames (both generic and issue-specific). Using methodological approaches of frame analysis from content analysis over discourse analysis and qualitative studies to experimental research, this research has brought valuable insights into media portrayals of climate change in different countries and their effects on audiences—even though it still has limitations that should be remedied in future research.
16. McConnell, A. (2019). The use of placebo policies to escape from policy traps. Journal of European Public Policy, 27, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1662827
ABSTRACT
This article provides a roadmap to help analysts approach the under-researched phenomena of policy-making driven to some extent by an attempt to show that governments and broader governing systems have a policy in place to manage tough policy issues, rather than addressing deeper causal factors of the problem. The metaphor of placebo policies is used to explore these issues, supported by a novel secondary metaphor of a ‘policy trap’ (expectations on governments and governing systems being greater than their capacity to realise). Examining the political value of ‘doing something’, it suggests that placebo responses are often the least risky means of escaping from policy traps. The framework is illustrated using a process of triangulation, though a detailed examination of the 1998 appointment of a ‘Drugs Tsar’ under the UK’s first term New Labour government.
17. McConnell, A. (2020). The politics of crisis terminology. In Oxford research encyclopedia, politics (pp. 181–208). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt2005s20.12
The politics of crisis terminology is rarely examined directly. Crisis is an “umbrella,” under which resides a multitude of terms such as accidents, emergencies, fiascos, disasters, and catastrophes, as well as variations such as natural disasters, transboundary crises, and mega-crises. Yet the sheer diversity and frequent ambiguity among terms reflects the “politics” of how societies and political actors seek to cope with and address extreme events, which often pose a mixture of threat and opportunity. Central to an understanding is how (a) different terms are means of framing issues such as the scale and causes of the crisis, (b) crisis terms are part of governing strategies, and (c) nongovernmental actors (opposition parties, media, lobby groups, social movements, and citizens) can seek to influence government. A pivotal point in developing an understanding of crisis terminology is that rather bemoaning the lack of singular meanings for crisis and associated terms, or criticizing actors for “abuse” of the terms, one should recognize and accept that complex and contested crisis language and definitions are in themselves manifestations of politics in political societies.
18. Morrison, T. H., Adger, N., Barnett, J., Brown, K., Possingham, H., & Hughes, T. (2020a). Advancing coral reef governance into the anthropocene. One Earth, 2(1), 64–74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2019.12.014
Abstract
The unprecedented global heatwave of 2014–2017 was a defining event for many ecosystems. Widespread degradation caused by coral bleaching, for example, highlighted the vulnerability of hundreds of millions of people dependent on reefs for their livelihoods, well-being, and food security. Scientists and policy makers are now reassessing long-held assumptions about coping with anthropogenic climate change, particularly the assumption that strong local institutions can maintain ecological and social resilience through ecosystem-based management, adaptation, and restoration. Governance is struggling to address the new normal as ecosystem assemblages transform to novel configurations. A central challenge for policy makers in the Anthropocene is navigating environmental crises and coping with societal insecurity and change. Ecosystem governance needs a new paradigm to embrace rapid change and shape future trajectories. In this Perspective, we focus on coral reefs as vanguards for governance transformation. We explain the spatial, temporal, and political dynamics of reefs as they respond to climate change and outline a new governance paradigm applicable to all ecosystems.
19. Morrison, T. H., Adger, W. N., Brown, K., Hettiarachchi, M., Huchery, C., Lemos, M. C., & Hughes, T. P. (2020b). Political dynamics and governance of World Heritage ecosystems. Nature Sustainability, 3(11), 947–955.
Abstract
Political dynamics across scales are often overlooked in the design, implementation and evaluation of environmental governance. We provide new evidence to explain how interactions between international organizations and national governments shape environmental governance and outcomes for 238 World Heritage ecosystems, on the basis of a new intervention–response–outcome typology. We analyse interactions between the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and 102 national governments responsible for implementing ecosystem protection under the World Heritage Convention between 1972 and 2019. We combine data on the reporting, deliberation and certification of individual ecosystem-level threats, with data on national governance quality, economic complexity and key stakeholder perspectives. We find that the extent of threatened ecosystems is seriously underestimated and that efforts to formally certify threatened ecosystems are often resisted by national governments. A range of responses to international intervention, including both productive and counterproductive responses, generates material impacts at the ecosystem level. Counterproductive responses occur in nations dependent on limited high-value natural resource industries, irrespective of overall level of economic development. We identify new political approaches to improve environmental governance, including how to overcome the problem of regulatory capture. Our findings inform how we can better anticipate and account for political dynamics in environmental governance.
20. Bostrom, A., Böhm, G., Hayes, A. L., & O’Connor, R. E. (2020). Credible threat: perceptions of pandemic coronavirus, climate change and the morality and management of global risks. Frontiers in Psychology, 11.
Abstract
Prior research suggests that the pandemic coronavirus pushes all the “hot spots” for risk perceptions, yet both governments and populations have varied in their responses. As the economic impacts of the pandemic have become salient, governments have begun to slash their budgets for mitigating other global risks, including climate change, likely imposing increased future costs from those risks. Risk analysts have long argued that global environmental and health risks are inseparable at some level, and must ultimately be managed systemically, to effectively increase safety and welfare. In contrast, it has been suggested that we have worry budgets, in which one risk crowds out another. “In the wild,” our problem-solving strategies are often lexicographic; we seek and assess potential solutions one at a time, even one attribute at a time, rather than conducting integrated risk assessments. In a U.S. national survey experiment in which participants were randomly assigned to coronavirus or climate change surveys (N = 3203) we assess risk perceptions, and whether risk perception “hot spots” are driving policy preferences, within and across these global risks. Striking parallels emerge between the two. Both risks are perceived as highly threatening, inequitably distributed, and not particularly controllable. People see themselves as somewhat informed about both risks and have moral concerns about both. In contrast, climate change is seen as better understood by science than is pandemic coronavirus. Further, individuals think they can contribute more to slowing or stopping pandemic coronavirus than climate change, and have a greater moral responsibility to do so. Survey assignment influences policy preferences, with higher support for policies to control pandemic coronavirus in pandemic coronavirus surveys, and higher support for policies to control climate change risks in climate change surveys. Across all surveys, age groups, and policies to control either climate change or pandemic coronavirus risks, support is highest for funding research on vaccines against pandemic diseases, which is the only policy that achieves majority support in both surveys. Findings bolster both the finite worry budget hypothesis and the hypothesis that supporters of policies to confront one threat are disproportionately likely also to support policies to confront the other threat.
21. Botzen, W., Duijndam, S., & van Beukering, P. (2021). Lessons for climate policy from behavioral biases towards COVID-19 and climate change risks. World Development, 137, 105214.
Abstract
COVID-19 and climate change share several striking similarities in terms of causes and consequences. For instance, COVID-19 and climate change affect deprived and vulnerable communities the most, which implies that effectively designed policies that mitigate these risks may also reduce the widening inequalities that they cause. Both problems can be characterized as low-probability–high consequence (LP-HC) risks, which are associated with various behavioral biases that imply that individual behavior deviates from rational risk assessments by experts and optimal preparedness strategies. One could view the COVID-19 pandemic as a rapid learning experiment about how to cope more effectively with climate change and develop actions for reducing its impacts before it is too late. However, the ensuing question relates to whether the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath will speed up climate change mitigation and adaptation policies, which depends on how individuals perceive and take action to reduce LP-HC risks. Using insights into behavioral biases in individual decisions about LP-HC risks based on decades of empirical research in psychology and behavioral economics, we illustrate how parallels can be drawn between decision-making processes about COVID-19 and climate change. In particular, we discuss six important risk-related behavioral biases in the context of individual decision making about these two global challenges to derive lessons for climate policy. We contend that the impacts from climate change can be mitigated if we proactively draw lessons from the pandemic, and implement policies that work with, instead of against, an individual’s risk perceptions and biases. We conclude with recommendations for communication policies that make people pay attention to climate change risks and for linking government responses to the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath with environmental sustainability and climate action.
22. Schneider, C. R., Dryhurst, S., Kerr, J., Freeman, A. L., Recchia, G., Spiegelhalter, D., & van der Linden, S. (2021). COVID-19 risk perception: a longitudinal analysis of its predictors and associations with health protective behaviours in the United Kingdom. Journal of Risk Research, 24(3-4), 294-313.
ABSTRACT
In this study, we present results from five cross-sectional surveys on public risk perception of COVID-19 and its association with health pro-tective behaviours in the UK over a 10-month period (March 2020 to January 2021). Samples were nationally balanced on age, gender, and ethnicity (total N ¼6,281). We find that although risk perception varies between the time points surveyed, it is consistently, significantly, and positively correlated with the reported adoption of protective health behaviours, such as wearing face masks or social distancing. There is also an increase in reported health protective behaviours in the UK between March 2020 and January 2021. The strength of the association between risk perception and behaviour varies by time point, with a stronger relationship in January 2021 compared to March and May 2020. We also assess the stability of the psychological determinants of risk perception over time. People’s prosocial tendencies and individualis-tic worldviews, experience with the virus, trust in government, science, and medical professionals, as well as personal and collective efficacy all emerged as significant predictors. With few exceptions, these predictors remained consistent in their relationship with risk perception over time. Lastly, we find that psychological factors are more predictive of risk per-ception than an objective measure of situational severity, i.e. the num-ber of confirmed COVID-19 cases at the time of data collection. Implications for risk communication are discussed.
23. Huynh, T. L. (2020). The COVID-19 risk perception: A survey on socioeconomics and media attention. Econ. Bull, 40(1), 758-764.
Abstract
This brief communication examines the role of socioeconomic factors and use of social media on the risk perception about COVID-19 in Vietnam, which shares a common border with China. Moreover, Vietnam was the first country to succeed in containment of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003. From a sample of 391 Vietnamese respondents aged from 15 to 47 years, the present study found that geographical regions and behaviors in using social media have a positive impact on the risk perception of COVID-19 epidemic in Vietnam. It also adds to the significance of understanding the risk perception among people to communicate the public health response to COVID-19 to curb the spread of this deadly virus.
24. Wise, T., Zbozinek, T. D., Michelini, G., Hagan, C. C., & Mobbs, D. (2020). Changes in risk perception and self-reported protective behaviour during the first week of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. Royal Society open science, 7(9), 200742.
Abstract
Efforts to change behaviour are critical in minimizing the spread of highly transmissible pandemics such as COVID-19. However, it is unclear whether individuals are aware of disease risk and alter their behaviour early in the pandemic. We investigated risk perception and self-reported engagement in protective behaviours in 1591 United States-based individuals cross-sectionally and longitudinally over the first week of the pandemic. Subjects demonstrated growing awareness of risk and reported engaging in protective behaviours with increasing frequency but underestimated their risk of infection relative to the average person in the country. Social distancing and hand washing were most strongly predicted by the perceived probability of personally being infected. However, a subgroup of individuals perceived low risk and did not engage in these behaviours. Our results highlight the importance of risk perception in early interventions during large-scale pandemics.
25. Cori, L., Bianchi, F., Cadum, E., & Anthonj, C. (2020). Risk perception and COVID-19.
Abstract
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is shaking the foundations of public health governance all over the world. Researchers are challenged by informing and supporting authorities on acquired knowledge and practical implications. This Editorial applies established theories of risk perception research to COVID-19 pandemic, and reflects on the role of risk perceptions in these unprecedented times, and specifically in the framework of the International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health Special Issue “Research about risk perception in the Environmental Health domain”.
26. Hubble-Rose, L., Quiggin, D., Froggatt, A., & De Meyer, K. (2021). Climate change risk assessment 2021.
Abstract
At COP26, the governments of highly emitting countries will have a critical opportunity to accelerate emissions reductions through ambitious revisions of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). If emissions follow the trajectory set by current NDCs, there is a less than 5 per cent chance of keeping temperatures well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and less than 1 per cent chance of reaching the 1.5°C target set by the 2015 Paris Agreement. Unless NDCs are dramatically increased, and policy and delivery mechanisms are revised accordingly, many of the climate change impacts described in this research paper are likely to be locked in by 2040, and become so severe they go beyond the limits of what nations can adapt to. As well as the immediate physical and socio-economic consequences of changes in climate, the paper captures the systemic cascading risks likely to arise as these direct risks and impacts compound to affect whole systems, including people, infrastructure, the economy, societal systems and ecosystems. A summary report of the research findings, intended for heads of government, is available as a PDF download in English and Chinese versions.
http://repo.floodalliance.net/jspui/handle/44111/4405
27. Fakhruddin, B., & Sillmann, J. Climate risk assessment gaps: seamless integration of weather and climate information for community resilience.
Abstract
This article is part of the ISC’s Transform21 series, which will explore the state of knowledge and action, five years on from the Paris Agreement and in a pivotal year for action on sustainable development.
The conclusions of the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group 1 emphasize that our commitment to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 needs to be stronger than ever, meaning that we can only achieve the long-term temperature goals identified in the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to 1.5°C through immediate, rapid and large-scale reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.. The main findings are consistent with the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), but highlight the urgency of achieving carbon neutrality while also adapting to the many unavoidable effects of climate change. Minimizing climate change vulnerabilities and risks depends on actionable, accessible and authoritative weather, water and climate services providing information on how environmental conditions and associated hazards may affect socio-economic activities and the environment.
https://council.science/current/blog/climate-risk-assessment-gaps/
28. Walton, J. L., & Levontin, P. (2021). Cover Note: Communicating Climate Risk Toolkit.
Abstract
The Communicating Climate Risk Toolkit (‘the Toolkit’), from the COP26 Universities Network (COP26 UN) and the Analysis under Uncertainty for Decision Makers network (AU4DM), seeks to narrow the gap between climate science and climate action, by providing insights, recommendations, and practical tools to support dialogue between scientists, decision-makers, and diverse stakeholders and communities. The Toolkit also endeavours to identify open problems and pose questions for further study and debate. The Toolkit builds on previous work by AU4DM and partly emerges from conversations at and around the COP26 Universities Network Climate Risk Summit, in September 2021, as well as survey questions shared with its participants.
http://www.cambridge.org/engage/coe/article-details/61791e5d4c04e8ef5d93f4da
29. Wenger, C., & Firm, W. L. (2021). LOSS & DAMAGE: ISSUES FOR COP26.
Parties have expressed interest in building out more effective implementation of the action and support for loss and damage (L&D). The interest in accelerating action and support for L&D has expressed itself in relation to three issues:
• The development of the Santiago Network (SN)
• The governance of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (mandated agenda item)
• The call to scale up finance to avert, minimize, and address L&D.
This paper provides context to and poses questions on these issues.
https://www.c2es.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/loss-damage-issues-for-cop26.pdf
30. Heaviside, C., & Taylor, J. Why High-Resolution Climate Modelling Matters: Cities and Health.
Abstract
Current and projected temperatures simulated by global climate models are typically output at a coarse resolution of 30–100 km. This is unhelpful for identifying climate-related public health risks in cities. New mapping is needed at higher resolution to better characterize hazards and prepare location-specific adaptation plans.
https://www.buildingsandcities.org/zh/insights/commentaries/hi-res-model.html
31. World Health Organization. (2021). COP26 special report on climate change and health: the health argument for climate action.
Extreme heat, floods, droughts, wildfires and hurricanes: 2021 has broken many records. The climate crisis is upon us, powered by our addiction to fossil fuels. The consequences for our health are real and often devastating. Climate change impacts health in all countries, but it hits people in low- and middle-income countries the hardest, especially small island developing states, whose very existence is under threat from rising sea levels. Any delay in acting on this global health threat will disproportionately affect the most disad-vantaged around the world. The COVID-19 pandemic is a visceral example of the inequitable impacts of such a global threat. To fully address the urgency of both these crises, we need to confront the inequal-ities that lie at the root of so many global health challenges.
Health and equity are central to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and to making COP26 a success. Protecting health requires action well beyond the health sector, in energy, transport, nature, food systems, finance and more. The ten recommendations outlined in this report – and the action points, resources and case studies that support them – provide concrete examples of interventions that, with support, can be scaled up rapidly to safeguard our health and our climate.
The recommendations are the result of extensive consultations with health professionals, organiza-tions and stakeholders worldwide, and represent a broad consensus statement urging governments to act to tackle the climate crisis, restore biodiversity, and protect health. Putting that into practice means investing in a healthier, fairer, and more resilient world. Advanced economies, in particular, have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to demonstrate true global solidarity, both in supporting an equitable response to COVID-19, and by making health central to the implemen-tation of the renewed climate commitments that they are making at COP26. It is the only way for us to get out of the current health crisis and prevent future ones.The health arguments for rapid climate action have never been clearer.
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/346168/9789240036727-eng.pdf?sequence=1
32. Rees, W. E. (2021). COP-26: stopping climate change and other illusions. Buildings and Cities.
Abstract
Do not expect significant progress from COP-26 on climate change mitigation. There are fundamental barriers that prevent the deep and rapid changes that scientists advocate. Most countries adhere to economic growth policies - which create ecological overshoot. Unless and until we accept that we must live within ecological limits, then climate change will not be adequately tackled. Energy and resource consumption must be addressed through controlled economic contraction.
https://www.buildingsandcities.org/insights/commentaries/cop26-illusions.html
33. Currie-Alder, B., Rosenzweig, C., Chen, M., Nalau, J., Patwardhan, A., & Wang, Y. (2021). Research for climate adaptation. Communications Earth & Environment, 2(1), 1-3.
Adaptation to climate change must be ramped up urgently. We propose three avenues to transform ambition to action: improve tracking of actions and progress, upscale investment especially in critical areas, and accelerate learning through practice.
https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-021-00294-5
34. Simpson, N. P., Mach, K. J., Constable, A., Hess, J., Hogarth, R., Howden, M., ... & Trisos, C. H. (2021). A framework for complex climate change risk assessment. One Earth, 4(4), 489-501.
Abstract
Real-world experience underscores the complexity of interactions among multiple drivers of climate change risk and of how multiple risks compound or cascade. However, a holistic framework for assessing such complex climate change risks has not yet been achieved. Clarity is needed regarding the interactions that generate risk, including the role of adaptation and mitigation responses. In this perspective, we present a framework for three categories of increasingly complex climate change risk that focus on interactions among the multiple drivers of risk, as well as among multiple risks. A significant innovation is recognizing that risks can arise both from potential impacts due to climate change and from responses to climate change. This approach encourages thinking that traverses sectoral and regional boundaries and links physical and socio-economic drivers of risk. Advancing climate change risk assessment in these ways is essential for more informed decision making that reduces negative climate change impacts.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590332221001792
35. Ebi, K. L. (2021). Assessing the health risks of climate change. In Climate Change and Global Public Health (pp. 111-121). Humana, Cham.E
Abstract
Climate change presents growing risks to human health. The extent and complexity of pathways between weather and other environmental variables and health makes the assessment of these risks challenging. Assumptions underlying traditional risk assessment approaches are ill-suited for estimating the health risks of climate change. Instead, vulnerability, capacity, and adaptation assessments can provide useful and timely knowledge to inform policies and measures to effectively prepare for and manage health risks as they change over spatial and temporal scales. At the international level, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) conducts assessments using expert judgment evaluations of the literature combined with the collective experience and judgment of the authors, to reach key conclusions about the state of knowledge of climate change risks and opportunities.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-54746-2_6
36. Lenton, T. M., Rockström, J., Gaffney, O., Rahmstorf, S., Richardson, K., Steffen, W., et al. (2019). Climate Tipping Points – Too Risky to Bet against. Nature, 575, 592–595. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586- 019- 03595- 0
Absztrakt
Politicians, economists and even some natural scientists have tended to assume that tipping points1 in the Earth system — such as the loss of the Amazon rainforest or the West Antarctic ice sheet — are of low probability and little understood. Yet evidence is mounting that these events could be more likely than was thought, have high impacts and are interconnected across different biophysical systems, potentially committing the world to long-term irreversible changes.
Here we summarize evidence on the threat of exceeding tipping points, identify knowledge gaps and suggest how these should be plugged. We explore the effects of such large-scale changes, how quickly they might unfold and whether we still have any control over them.
In our view, the consideration of tipping points helps to define that we are in a climate emergency and strengthens this year’s chorus of calls for urgent climate action — from schoolchildren to scientists, cities and countries.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) introduced the idea of tipping points two decades ago. At that time, these ‘large-scale discontinuities’ in the climate system were considered likely only if global warming exceeded 5 °C above pre-industrial levels. Information summarized in the two most recent IPCC Special Reports (published in 2018 and in September this year)2,3 suggests that tipping points could be exceeded even between 1 and 2 °C of warming (see ‘Too close for comfort’).
37. Rockstrom, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K., Persson, A., Chapin, F. S. I. I. I., Lambin, E., et al. (2009). Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity. Ecology and Society, 14. https://doi.org/10.5751/ ES- 03180- 140232
Anthropogenic pressures on the Earth System have reached a scale where abrupt globalenvironmental change can no longer be excluded. We propose a new approach to global sustainability in which we define planetary boundaries within which we expect that humanity can operate safely. Transgressing one or more planetary boundaries may be deleterious or even catastrophic due to the risk of crossing thresholds that will trigger non-linear, abrupt environmental change within continental- to planetary-scale systems. We have identified nine planetary boundaries and, drawing upon current scientific understanding, we propose quantifications for seven of them. These seven are climate change (CO2 concentration in the atmosphere <350 ppm and/or a maximum change of +1 W m-2 in radiative forcing);ocean acidification (mean surface seawater saturation state with respect to aragonite ≥ 80% of pre-industriallevels); stratospheric ozone (<5% reduction in O3 concentration from pre-industrial level of 290 Dobson Units); biogeochemical nitrogen (N) cycle (limit industrial and agricultural fixation of N2 to 35 Tg N yr-1) and phosphorus (P) cycle (annual P inflow to oceans not to exceed 10 times the natural background
weathering of P); global freshwater use (<4000 km3 yr-1 of consumptive use of runoff resources); landsystem change (<15% of the ice-free land surface under cropland); and the rate at which biological diversity is lost (annual rate of <10 extinctions per million species). The two additional planetary boundaries for which we have not yet been able to determine a boundary level are chemical pollution and atmospheric aerosol loading. We estimate that humanity has already transgressed three planetary boundaries: for climate change, rate of biodiversity loss, and changes to the global nitrogen cycle. Planetary boundaries are interdependent, because transgressing one may both shift the position of other boundaries or cause them to be transgressed. The social impacts of transgressing boundaries will be a function of the social–ecological resilience of the affected societies. Our proposed boundaries are rough, first estimates only, surrounded by large uncertainties and knowledge gaps. Filling these gaps will require major advancements in Earth System and resilience science. The proposed concept of “planetary boundaries” lays the groundwork for shifting our approach to governance and management, away from the essentially sectoral analyses of limits to growth aimed at minimizing negative externalities, toward the estimation of the safe space for human
development. Planetary boundaries define, as it were, the boundaries of the “planetary playing field” for humanity if we want to be sure of avoiding major human-induced environmental change on a global scale.