

Project closing

Project closure report

1. Presenting the results of scientific and technical content

This research is a follow-up of our 1988/93, 1997, 2001 empirical studies. In 2009 and 2010 we found 3568 persons representing the elite. Interviews were taken with the representatives of political elite (401), economical elite (438), cultural elite (501), Hungary's minorities' (German, Roma, Slovakian, Romanian) elite (522), Hungarian Slovakian economical (398) and cultural (395) elite, Hungarian Romanian economical (407) and cultural (506) elite.

This research collected a nationally and internationally unique database as being widespread and the comparable with previous data (from 21 years perspective!).

The impact of the research is increased by the fact, that it has been the first comparative investigation between representatives of elites of Hungary's minorities, the Hungarian Slovakian and Romanian minorities, and the Hungarian elite.

Research of elite has been an honored topic of sociology after 1990, but the database of 2009 is especially informative, because it is representing information from a period of crisis about the elite's formation, behavior, values, lifestyle, political preferences, identity, and reputation. Grounded on this information it is analyzable whether this elite is capable of variously handling and managing the crisis.

The elite's answer of the crisis is closing down and the endeavor of monopolizing the disposition above the resources of developing. The elite's reaction is a structural phenomenon. One of the reasons of dysfunctionality of political institutions and political parties is that elite's strategies are led by such demands on total power, organizing and leading the society, which is already exceeded by the society.

Based on the data of 2009, the cultural and economical elite is closing down. The distribution of age is showing characteristics of changing towards: 1) the increasing ratio of elder age-groups

and 2) stabilizing the age characteristics of getting into the elite. Between 2001 and 2009, in cultural elite, the ratio of oldest, above-sixty age-group increased the ratio of younger, under-forty age-group decreased. The hardest for younger generation is getting into the cultural elite. Despite the fact, that since the middle of nineties the number of (university) graduates has increased, the institutional background of getting into the elite is slowing the circulation of elite.

We used the Hoppenstedt Bonnier¹ database for selecting sample of **economical elite** and we used the positional definition of economical elite. We – similarly to Burnham (1965) – defined economical elite as manager-elite and surveyed 457 firm-managers. In 2009 the base of economical elite sample was the population of leaders of firms earning above 2 billion Hungarian forints income. Thus in our research – similarly to our previous researches – the studied population was constituted of middle and big company leaders.

We used two filters evolving the economical elite sample. We sought for those leaders of enterprises and state institutions, where the average yearly income was beyond 2 billion Hungarian forints, and we developed a quota-system depending on the firm's profile. Originally we set up four domains: trade, manufacturing firm, enterprise of financial affairs, other (service and logistics). We changed this structure according to our results from interviewing: first we sought all members participating in the Hoppenstedt database, who were willing to give interview and were those fitting in our sample criteria. We regarded those persons as member of economical elite who were gaining admittance and reputation in economical life – these people were named by the first interviewed members (from 457). Unfortunately these persons weren't all available for the research, so we couldn't investigate the reputational subsample of economical elite. But due to our method 19 persons were interviewed from the 100 list of richest people in Hungary in 2009.

Table 1. Sample of economical elite by quotes (438 answers – 95,8% valid answers)

	N	%
Trade	160	36,5
Service, logistics	129	29,5
Financial	29	6,6

¹ The Hoppenstedt Bonnier database is the current register of firms in Hungary.

affairs		
Manufacturing	120	27,4
Sum total:	438	100,0

In economical elite the ratio of under-forty age-group in 2009 is a little higher than in previous years, but there's an obvious increase in the over-fifty age-group. In the nineties there was a big opportunity for younger generation for ascending to the economical elite, but this progress slowed down after the millennium. In cultural elite the reproduction is much stronger. The transformation of cultural, educational (especially university education and classification) system didn't open radically new possibilities for entering the elite. The specific characteristics of cultural markets, the state and local governmental participation in financing the culture and science resulted bigger elite-reproduction compared to economical elite. In 2009 the cultural elite's only 7,2% is under-forty. Between 2001 and 2009 the ratio of under-forty and over 59 age-groups' changed for the benefit of elder. Similar to economical elite the quarter of cultural elite has entered the elite after 2001, but significant part of them only as the result of continuing carriers and not very young. Neither the cultural elite became a totally closed "club" of society, but the functioning of cultural, educational and scientific system of institutions' structure is much more hierarchical and it favors slow carriers and has opportunities for less younger generation to enter elite. On one hand the obtained cultural elite-positions are more easily converted into political or economical capital, than the other way, and on the other hand the positions are more secured institutionally than in the case of economical or particularly political elite.

We used two different sampling approaches for evolving the **Hungarian cultural elite-sample**. Depending on the positional sampling procedure different cultural institution's leaders and the selected elite-members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences got into the sample. Apart from the positional definition we regard as member of cultural elite those persons who gained reputation in cultural life. Based on the reputation-based approach those persons got into the sample as well, who gained Széchenyi- or Kossuth-prize or other cultural prizes, those who are admitted by the pop-trade, and the leaders of bestseller lists. Through the research we used a special sampling technique: we asked the persons already member of the cultural elite-sample, who they take as today's Hungarian cultural life's prominent person. Based on their lists we made a 100-membered reputational subgroup.

The sample of cultural elite consists of:

Table 2. The sample of cultural elite

	N	%
Members of Academy of Sciences	50	10,0
Leaders of cultural, scientific institutions	52	10,4
Leaders of publicity agencies	27	5,4
Leaders of universities, colleges	15	3,0
Leaders of daily newspapers	8	1,6
Leaders of periodicals	52	10,4
Prize winners (Kossuth-, Széchenyi- and othet prizes)	150	29,9
Non-classical music prize winners	25	5,0
Libri bestsellers	22	4,4
Reputational subgroup	100	20,0
Sum total	501	100,0

In the sample of cultural elite 47,9 percent of the sample-members is leader and 42,5 percent is intellectual employee. Consistently, in positional subsample of cultural elite the ratio of leaders is saliently high (71,1%), while those who were selected by reputation the employee status is typical (55,6%) and among them the leader position is only 32%. Apart from positions, we can grab the characteristics being member of the cultural elite by different cultural indicators. The high status of elite can clearly be proved by the educational level: the ratio of graduates in the whole sample is 70,1%, 23 percentage has academic degree, that means that the studied elite's 93,1% is highly educated. This ratio is 98 percent in the case of positional elite and 89,9 percent in the case of reputational elite. High degree of holding the possession of cultural goods is represented as well in the number of diplomas: 23,4 percentage of the cultural elite holds more than one diplomas – this is characteristic of the positional subsample where the ratio is 27,4 percentage, and it is a little less in the reputational subsample (20,6%). The picture of cultural elite is similar regarding the foreign language knowledge. 45,7 percentage speaks one foreign language, 43,5 percentage speaks more than one foreign language, the ratio of those not speaking any foreign language is low: 10,8 percentage. The results are corresponding in both subsamples. High degree of holding the possession of cultural goods is characteristic of the members of cultural elite; we were able to reach with both sampling methods the leaders of the societal hierarchy.

The Hungarian cultural elite is valuing the achievements by an own inner standard: for gaining the reputation the most important is the cultural capital. From outside effects reaching the cultural domain the role of the media is determinant. For the members of elite it is obviously the high culture is the referential point, where they act themselves and this is the sphere where from they have chosen the biggest persons of Hungarian cultural life. But the elite's culture is only a subculture within culture. In other segments of culture there are other reputation-producing mechanisms working, than within elite. At the same time it is true that the cultural elite is capable of spreading the valuing aspects mainly through the media and – which is more important – through the school system. From those members of the elite, who are mostly admitted, will become the classic representatives in school books, thus it is not equal at all who and with what kind of reputation become part of cultural canon.

Investigating the **present financial state of elite-members** we used objective and subjective indicators as well. In this aspect the economical elite was on the first place and the cultural and political elite came after. But regarding the different properties, the political elite possesses an average 6-7 different means, in contrast with the cultural and economical elite possessing 1-3. In short, we suppose that the financial background of the political elite is quite favorable too if we regard the sum values of properties, only their net income and their real estate property is lower than the other two groups'. In case of political elite the heterogeneous portfolio is important because of publicity and regular worth declaration – they care more about not to have salient values. We also found in our analysis, that the position of members of economical elite is worse also because they have more people in the same household to share their properties with.

The subjective indicators weren't in harmony with the objective indicators. The satisfaction with life standard was correlating with the income and the values of real estates; therefore the economical elite was the most satisfied. The smaller satisfaction of political elite can be related to the fact, that their financial state is not that favorable as we supposed earlier. If we regard the three elite's joint indicators, it is seen, that this group on the top of society, despite the good financial state, is relatively unsatisfied with its position. The other subjective indicator was to range themselves into societal classes: the economical elite ranged itself to the highest, but if we regard all the three elite groups, it is seen, that they range themselves rather to the middle class than to the high class. From cultural background indicators first we investigated the institutionalized cultural capital. We showed that the elite's 92-96% have diplomas, and the cultural elite is possessing academic degree in high proportion. Hungarian

society's meritocracy has been justified in the aspect of elite as well, because there is a strong correlation between academic qualification and status and the cultural capital, all the three are most important resources for elite after the democratic transformation. For the members of economical and political elite one way of ascending was to get more diplomas, while for the cultural elite it was in getting the academic and specific degrees.

Among elite-members there are more and more parents with diploma and fathers having employees. From the three elite groups, as expected, the cultural elite members parents were best educated, the father's education had a strong influence on their later assignment, thus the cultural elite's fathers had the most favorable position on labour market (from the number of employees). The economical and political elite members were more mobile compared to their parents, than the cultural elite's.

In 2009 we chose the sample of **political elite** for the survey from the people holding positions like: the chief officers of the President of Republic office, the government's officers, the leaders of independent state organizations, Members of Parliament, leaders of national minorities local governments offices, administrative leader officers, mayor's leader officers, leaders of county's local governments, leaders of parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties, leaders of social organizations, leaders of national minorities, ethnic local governments, sport and other unions' chief officers, leaders of trade unions, economical and financial leaders, leaders of Chambers, high dignitary of the Church, denominations.

Through the political-public elite sampling we used the positional approach, considering that these positions in the studied field are both horizontally (government, Church, organization etc.) and vertically (ministries, under-secretary, mayor) segmented elites. We used *The book of public life 2009* for sampling. We defined the institutions, which were the base of our sampling, and by professional selection from the leaders and chief officers of these institutions we made the list of questioned and two other supplementary lists. We asked 401 persons.

In the political-public survey we considered these types of institutions quotes in our sample.

Table 3: The sample of political elite by quotes

	N	%
President of Republic office	7	1,7
Members of Parliament	27	6,7

Ministries	19	4,7
Prime Ministerial office	1	,2
Independent state organizations	27	6,7
Hungary and the European Union	4	1,0
Local governments	56	14,0
Parties	7	1,7
Societal organizations	51	12,7
National minorities, ethnicities office	9	2,2
Sport leagues	18	4,5
Trade unions	71	17,7
Economical chambers	47	11,7
Financial agencies	12	3,0
Chambers	14	3,5
Church, denominations	31	7,7
Sum total	401	100,0

Within the political elite there is a sharp dividing line - based on the structure of activity - between the institutional and the politician positions. The main characteristics of the parties and the elite of government is professionalization: the professional knowledge falls into background and the politician profession gets into foreground, while for the elite of public it is the professional knowledge which is dominant.

The study of political elite's attitude towards the role of state shows crumbled along the elite's values. There are no clean cut groups of values. The political elite cannot be characterized as a determined value-chooser, and the majority can be seen neither state-sided, nor party-sided. This is strengthened by their opinion that the economical and political elite is influencing the country's affairs to a large extent, they measure their influence equally. The elite is – theoretically – playing a model-role in the society and they take part actively in forming the political community. The political elite can sharply be grouped to politically active or inactive groups, this grouping coincide with the sectoral-positional separation with the matched activity structure. Active political behavior is a characteristic of the elite of parties and government and the professional politicians. In case of civil activity the political elite shows a more uniformed picture: the members of the political elite can be characterized by active civil/public life, which means taking offices in civil organizations, taking part in community programs and appearing in the media. In societal activity namely informal

collective activities there are big differences between the political elite's two groups and the public elite; the elite of parties and government show bigger activity. It is true for all the political elite, that basically they are active in cultural activities (theater, concerts, cinema), while the difference is between the parties and elite of government is in the relation to the sports and the evening activities. Overall it can be declared, that the informal activities are less characteristic for the political elite, than formal activities (mainly civil, but in the case of political elite, it means political activities as well). The high degree of public activity in the case of political elite is combined with individualization. The participation in community acting on formal grounds is not combined with the personal characteristics of collectivity. From all these we assume that it is helping the elitist democracy (Bihari 2005), where the formal grounds of public life is conquered by the political elite, without transmitting the ethos of collectivity to the society, which means it is less contributing the development of political community and participating democracy. The political elite in 2009 is only partly suiting the expectations defined also by Bibó, to "find and apply to themselves the new aspects of society's assessment, which respond to the changed societal public belief, and are capable of replacing the community's confused harmony".

While the economical and cultural elite has strong consciousness of identity, it is much weaker than the political elite's.

As a result of analytical identity analysis the political elite's identity (their descent family's status) has two types. One type is from a high status family, mainly spending childhood in the capital. The other type is from low or mixed status family, mainly grew up in villages or small towns. As an element of chosen identity, the characteristics of professional carriers are that current political elite has working experience (in many cases a lot indeed) at firms close to the state or the state. Thus, in building their carrier they are linked to public sphere, they know the functions and the logic and later they profit from this knowledge. Altogether the third of the respondents are regarding themselves as member of political elite, about this inconsistency the qualitative analysis will show deeper insights.

Professionalism is strongly present on politician identity, beside the self-definition through the party is in the background. The respondents try to demark themselves from being a politician and represent themselves as an expert not linked to parties and politics. Right after the democratic transformation, when being a politician was a new role for all participants, this role didn't have any unambiguous expectations, rules and norms, belonging to a party gave security, guidance for the new politicians for the mode how to become a politician. Now they don't need this anymore, the parties have lost their fundamental role in defining one's

politician identity. For the decreasing of parties' importance might contribute that the people are disappointed in politics and parties. As if it would be less authentic to be a member of a party, than being an independent expert. It could be the explanation for our results from interviews that the represented political identities of respondents almost never were present - they didn't define themselves on the right-left or conservatism-liberalism pivot and the moral, ethical approach of politician carrier was almost never mentioned in their narrative. In most of their life story the political scene was shown as a certain kind of harmonic world, where the political rivals aren't represented and where with the right behavior, communication and compromises success can be reached. There was only one interview in which the conflicts were mentioned instead of compromises, this one respondent talked openly and sincerely about political sides and conflicts.

The political scale of values of **national elite groups** can not be seemed clear; there were several contradictory statements said during our research. The radical parties' simultaneous rejection and the relative high ratio of extreme viewpoints on political values scale may seem dissonant. It is typical in several elite groups: one third of the given elite group thinks that self-provision and state's role should get a bigger emphasis in people's life.

The Hungarian political elite placed itself more on the left wing on the left-right scale in autumn 2009. But the level of settlement is different: while those, who acknowledge themselves both right-winger and conservative are 29 percent in the elite group, those who define themselves left-winger and liberal are a little more than 24 percent. Regarding the respondents ratio, the economical elite seemed the most balanced: each segment (left-wing – central – right-wing) got one third in this elite group. The cultural elite is unambiguously reckoning itself to the left, but the deviation of opinions was the biggest in this group. Regarding the conservative-liberal pivot it can be stated, that the political elite is more conservative, while the economical elite has mainly liberal position. The cultural elite has a sharp character in this dimension as well: with it's unambiguous liberal attitude it is slightly different from the other two groups.

About relation to the state: the political and the cultural elite was on the same platform – in these two elite groups there were no sharp statements on the clear-cut preferences; in both groups in almost the same proportion were those on the same opinion. The economical elite was the exception: it was obviously representing the market-sided opinion in more questions (indicators).

After the democratic transformation the elite (just as the Hungarian society at all) was long searching for preferences, till around 1998 the electoral attitudes were outlined. Right before the 2010 year's parliamentary election the previously left-winger political and economical elite was showing the signs of shifting towards the right-wing. But the elite is suspicious with the parties – as shown in the low sympathy indicators. The tendency is characteristic for all the three groups of elite. The distrust is loosening in a way by the planned participation ratio at the elections. In any case, it is highly remarkable how the political elite is unsatisfied with itself, which might refer to a healthy self-criticism.

In statistical analysis it was reasonable to consider persons permanently linked to the Hungarian minority local governments as the minorities' community elite's sample. At the same time, our decision was highly influenced by the fact, that in Hungary only in case of members of minorities local government do we have a public administrative, authentic, open database with declaration of identity. The societal-economical status of members of minorities local government is generally better than the community's whole, but they represent well every segment of the community's verticium. This enables to investigate those elite's characteristics compared to other members of the subsample. The biggest difference on societal-economical status is between Roma members of the community. But it has to be considered, that in their cases it is the biggest ratio in the subsample of those who have risen by their safeguarding activity.

It is remarkable that none of the respondents' societal-economical status correlates with their fathers' in the subsample. This is another warning that only a part of minorities local government elite was reached in our study. The amplification can be done by uncovering with the reputational elite's characteristics with the help of the results of this study and it needs another research to make clear what are the identity characters of the minorities institutional leaders and what is their relationship like to their minority. From the structure of these three relations deeper consequences can be done about the embeddings, efficiency and future optimal authority of minority's local government.

The majority (65-75%) of **Slovakian national minority's cultural and economical elite** consists of members from first generation intellectual class families; they are children of parents from many different societal classes. They are partly from villages, partly from small towns of the country. Thus, regarding the structure of societal origin, the Slovakian national minority is heterogeneous, with its positive and negative consequences.

Both elite's majority was born in a village or a town under 50 thousand residents (including the small towns under 10 thousand residents). The cultural elite is rather descended from villages, while almost the half of economical elite's members is from towns under 50 thousand residents.

Table 4. Type of place of birth (%)

	Cultural elite (N=385)	Economical elite (N=309)
Village	59	47
Town under 50 thousand residents	36	42
Big city	3	4
Capital	2	7

Comparing the respondents and their parents qualifications, we can assume, that most of the Slovakian national intellectuals are first generational intellectuals, thus both elites are highly mobile intergenerational.

In 1997 one fifth of the intellectuals had at least one parent intellectual, while others were children of dependent (34%), worker (12%) and agricultural labourer (11%) mothers and worker (37%) and agricultural labourer (20%) fathers.

Regarding the indicators of standard of living both members of cultural and economical elite is living better life than the average Slovakian Hungarian. This may be supported by the fact, that members of the elite have more workplaces: three-quarters of the cultural elite and 83 percent of economical elite has a second workplace beside the main workplace/enterprise. In their main workplaces 86 percent of the members of the economical elite are in leader position. This is less typical for the cultural elite, but still their majority (59%) is in leader position. The identity of Slovakian national elite is ambivalent; although the cultural elite is mainly identifying itself with the cultural elite, the economical elite is identifying itself secondly with the economical elite; the majority of them are representing themselves on professional ground. This result is reflecting on the 1997 study of intellectuals, that is: the professional identity is stronger than class identity.

In present dimensions it can be said that that the membership of an organization, which is one indicator of community work is characteristic for approx. the two-third of the cultural elite and approx. one-third of the economical elite. But these are mainly professional

organizations, where there is professional work and not definitely work for the community (although professional and community-public work is often entwined, it is hardly separable in specific professions). The three most common public roles are: participating in community programs, taking functions in societal organizations and writing petitions. All three is more characteristic for the cultural elite than the economical elite. Besides, the cultural elite is more active in public, like writing and expressing opinions in the media.

The results of elite research show that Slovakian national elite is regarding its task important in continuance of Hungarian nation, which is shown in data below:

- three-quarters of the cultural elite and two-third of economical elite agrees that the historical mission of minority's elite is to work on Slovakian Hungarians position;
- 85 percent of cultural elite and 78 percent of economical elite agrees that it is the elite's task to work on making better life for Slovakian Hungarians.

The **Transylvanian national economical and cultural elite** is bound together mostly by "being Transylvanian". They identify themselves first as being Transylvanian; native land and birthplace is Transylvania for them. Apart from this identification the studied groups (minority's economical and cultural elites) were separated in almost every socio-demographic variable: the mode of recruitment, the roles, the political attachments etc. Comparing the results we assume, that minority's cultural elite is more embedded in state's and authorities' structures, than the same Hungarian elite. This can be interpreted as the minority's elite is expecting the state and the state's tolerant behavior to solve the community's problems; after 1996 they can't even imagine not being member of executive authority. The minority elite's positive attitude towards the authority is not led by personal ambitions but got from the structural position if minority-majority.

In both elite groups males are predominant, their ratio in the economical elite is 87,9 percent, in the cultural elite 83,6 percent. This is a much higher ratio than the registered males ratio (48,1%) of Romanian Hungarian population measured in 2002. The sex compound of cultural reputational elite group is not different notably from the whole elite group's. The Romanian Hungarian minorities can be regarded as a highly male-dominant group. Studying the respondent's age groups we can state that the economical elite is between 25 and 81, while cultural elite is scattered between 18 and 85. The average age of economical elite is 45,6, the cultural elite is 10 years more: 56 years. The cultural reputational elite's average age is slightly more: 57,9 ages.

Since our research's target group was the Hungarian minority elite group, it wasn't surprising that both elite group members acknowledged themselves as Hungarian nationalities (the cultural elite's 98,4 percent, the economical elite's 95,8 percent). Beside that in small percentage of Romanian, German and other nationalities were marked on the questionnaire.

We got high ratios regarding the mother tongue: the economical elite's 98 percentage and the cultural elite's 99,6 percentage marked Hungarian as mother tongue. Interestingly in both elite groups there were more persons marking Romanian (beside Hungarian) as mother tongue, than marking Romanian as a nationality. German and other languages as mother tongue were marked higher ratio by members of economical elite, than cultural elite. This indicates, that among elite members there is a smaller group of people knowing other languages as mother tongue, at the same time we can see that from the aspect of mother tongues the economical elite is more heterogeneous than cultural elite.

The cultural reputational elite can be regarded "more Hungarian" in the aspects of nationality and mother tongue since more than the complete cultural subsample, 98,9 percent of them have acknowledged themselves as Hungarian nationalities and marked Hungarian as their mother tongue. Based on our data, we interpret this quite paradoxical that while the cultural elite is depending on a great extent – even existentially – on the Romanian state (that means they are working for institutes maintained by public funds) they are strongly attached to Hungary still on the level of attitudes, discourses, and professional relationships. Parallel, the economical elite is obviously working along the logic of markets, but pragmatically acts towards the Romanian facilities and Hungary is in many contexts only one figure in the international world.

In the beginning of the nineties, among cultural elite ideologist took an important role, who built a particular minority institutional system onto the middle of nineties. After the millennium there were new elites, who got positions from the old-new institutions, or absolutely politics-free, based on their professional achievements. In parallel the members of economical elite – by the companies established in the nineties – were beginning to strengthen. In this progress there was a little to do with strong relations with minority politics (with one or two exceptions). The political elite was beginning to possess an increasing authority and its influence was strengthened from the middle of nineties, when minority politicians began to take roles. The previous resistant, oppositional attitudes were overshadowing, which took the professionalism in the foreground in the minority political sphere which resulted the displacement of human intellectuals from politics along with running the technocrat, professional strata. One part of the cultural elite succeeded to

represent themselves as experts, but practically there happened a restructuring in the Transylvanian Hungarian cultural elite's recruitment and the professional selection strengthened.

The results fulfill the target tasks named in the contract. Small differences are only on the number of respondents, because of the answering willingness and accessibility. In sum in the relation of the research, the number of respondents reached the planned amount, because we asked more persons in other elite groups, while in difficultly accessible elite groups there were less people asked. The difference is never more than 105.

The project's intended and actual term

There were differences from the schedule because of technical change in questions. According to that the project ended on the 31st of December 2010 instead of the 1st of November 2010.

Participants of the project

Names of persons participating in the research and actual working hours filling with the project*

Persons participating in professional work	Consortium member (number)	Tasks (number in the workplan)	Expended time (days)
Kovách Imre	1	1.1	12
Tóth Ágnes	3	2.1	10
Papp Z. Attila	4	3.1.1	10
Szarka László	2	3.2.1	10
Sum total			42
Number of researchers converted into full worktime:			1,2 (person)

2009

Name of expert	Expert's identifier	Status of contributor*	Consortium member number	Number of the task	Working time input (FTE)
Kovách, Imre	KOVIMR08	Researcher with PhD	1	1.2.1., 1.2.2., 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 3.1.2.1., 3..12.2., 3.2.2.1., 3.2.2.2.	0,19
Tóth, Ágnes	TOTAGN61	Researcher with PhD	1	2.2.1, 2.2.2,	0,085
Papp Z., Attila	PAPATT01	Researcher with PhD	1	3.1.2.1., 3..12.2., 3.2.2.1.	0,085
Szarka, László	SZALAS53	Researcher with PhD	1	3.2.2.1., 3.2.2.2.	0,009
Csurgó, Bernadett	CSUBET77	Young researcher without PhD	1	2.2.1, 2.2.2; 1.2.1., 1.2.2.	0,19
Kristóf, Luca	KRILUC79	Young researcher without PhD	1	1.2.1., 1.2.2.;; 1.2.1., 1.2.2.	0,05
Légmán, Anna		Young researcher without PhD	1	3.2.2.1., 3.2.2.2.;; 1.2.1., 1.2.2.	0,19
Megyesi, Boldizsár	MEGBOL76	Young researcher without PhD	1	3.1.2.1., 3..12.2.;; 1.2.1., 1.2.2.	0,19
Sum total (FTE)				1,009	
Number of researchers converted into full work time (per person)				1,25	

2010

Name of expert	Expert's identifier	Status of contributor*	Consortium member number	Number of the task	Working time input (FTE)
Kovách, Imre	KOVIMR08	Researcher with PhD	1	1.4, 4	0,25
Tóth, Ágnes	TOTAGN61	Researcher with PhD	1	2.2.3, 2.3., 2.4.	0,35
Papp Z., Attila	PAPATT01	Researcher with PhD	1	3.1.2.3, 3.1.3., 3.1.4.	0,35
Lampl, Zsuzsanna		Researcher with PhD	1	3.2.2.3, 3.2.3., 3.2.4.	0,25
Csurgó, Bernadett	CSUBET77	Young researcher without PhD	1	1.2.3, 1.3., 1.4	0,3
Kristóf, Luca	KRILUC79	Young researcher without PhD	1	1.2.3, 1.3.1.4	0,3
Légmán, Anna		Young researcher without PhD	1	1.2.3, 1.3., 1.4	0,3
Megyesi, Boldizsár	MEGBOL76	Young researcher without PhD	1	1.2.3, 1.3. 1.4	0,3
Sum total (FTE)				2,42	
Number of researchers converted into full work time (per person)				1,98	

Monitoring indicators of the project

Supplement no. 9. contains the monitoring data.

Here we report publications:

We publish the results of the research in the book of essays of Kovách, Imre (ed) *Eliték a válság korában [Elites in the age of crisis]* MTAPTI, MTA-ENKI, Argumentum Budapest 2011, which will be published in February 2011. The whole book's proof's electronic version is included as a CD supplement

Contents of the volume (*English titles in brackets*)

Kovách, Imre: Gazdasági, politikai, kulturális és kisebbségi elitek Magyarországon – kisebbségi magyar elitek Romániában és Szlovákiában
[Economical, political, cultural and minority's elite in Hungary – national minority elites in Romania and Slovakia]

ELITKUTATÁSOK ÉS ELITFOGALMAK

[Researches and concepts of elite]

Szabari, Vera: Társadalmi elitkutatások Magyarországon 1989 előtt [Societal elite researches before 1989 in Hungary]

Kristóf, Luca: Elitkutatások Magyarországon 1989-2010 [Researches of elite in Hungary 1989-2001]

Légmán, Anna: A kvalitatív módszerek helye az elitkutatásokban [Qualitative methods in research of elite]

Tóth, Ágnes – Vékás, János: Eredmények – kutatási feladatok – módszertani megfontolások [Results, research tasks, methodological reflections]

Papp Z., Attila: Az 1989 utáni romániai, illetve romániai magyar elitek tipológiai és értelmezései

[Typology and interpretation of Romanian and Romanian Hungarian elite's after 1989]

Mészáros, Magdolna: Betekintés a szlovákiai elit szociológiai elméletébe és kutatásába [An insight into Slovakian elite's sociological theory and research]

MAGYARORSZÁGI ELITEK

[Hungarian elites]

Csurgó, Bernadett – Megyesi, Boldizsár: Elit-meghatározások és elitcsoportok – A 2009-es magyarországi elitfelvételek fogalmi-mintavételi háttere

[Elite definitions and elite groups – conceptual and sampling background for Hungarian study in 2009]

Fényes, Hajnalka: A magyarországi elit kulturális és anyagi tőkéi és társadalmi mobilitása

[Cultural and financial capital and societal mobility of Hungarian elite]

Kovách, Imre: Gazdasági elitcsoportok és vállalataik

[Economical elite groups and their companies]

Kristóf, Luca: A magyar kulturális elit és a reputációs elitcsoport

[Hungarian cultural elite and reputational elite group]

Csurgó, Bernadett: Politikai elit: közéleti szerep és szerepvállalás

[Political elite: public roles and undertaking roles]

Bányai, Borbála – Légmán, Anna: Politikus életrajzok 1989 után

[Politicians' biographies after 1989]

Girst, Noémi – Keil, András: Zavar a fejekben? A magyarországi elit és a politika 2009-ben

[Confusion in heads? Hungarian elites and politics in 2009]

Czibere, Ibolya: Nők a kulturális, gazdasági és politikai elit tagjai között

[Women among members of cultural, economical and political elite]

KISEBBSÉGI ELITEK

[Minority elites]

Tóth, Ágnes – Vékás, János: Kisebbségi elit és önkormányzatok

[Minority elite and local governments]

Lampl, Zsuzsanna: A szlovákiai magyar kulturális és gazdasági elit szociológiai portréja

[Sociological portrait of Slovakian Hungarian cultural and economical elite]

Papp Z., Attila – Márton, János: Párhuzamos világok? Az erdélyi magyar gazdasági és kulturális elit szocio-demográfiai jellemzői

[Parallel worlds? Socio-demographic characteristics of Transylvanian Hungarian economical and cultural elite]

We reported our results on 7th of December 2010 at the “Hungarian elites – minority elites” conference at the Institute for Political Science and Research Institute of Ethnic and National Minorities at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

The research results were presented on the conference as seen below (*English titles in brackets*):

KOVÁCH, IMRE (IPS HAS): A magyarországi elitek, kisebbségi magyar elitek kutatás eredményeinek bemutatása

[Presenting the result of research on elites of Hungary and Hungarian minorities' elites]

CSURGÓ, BERNADETT (IPS HAS): Politikai elit – politikai közösség

[Political elite – political community]

BÁNYAI, BORBÁLA – LÉGMÁN, ANNA (IPS HAS): A politikai elit identitása

[Identity of political elite]

KRISTÓF, LUCA (IPS HAS): Kulturális elit – a presztízs meghatározói

[Cultural elite – determinants of prestige]

CZIBERE, IBOLYA (University of Debrecen): Nők az elit tagjai között

[Women among the members of elite]

FÉNYES HAJNALKA (University of Debrecen): A magyarországi elit kulturális és anyagi tőkési és társadalmi mobilitása

[Cultural and financial capital and societal mobility of Hungarian elite]

TÓTH ÁGNES, VÉKÁS JÁNOS (IENM HAS): Elit – identitás – modernizáció. A magyarországi kisebbségi elitek szerepe közösségeik modernizációjában

[Elite – Identity – Modernization. The role of Hungarian minority elites in modernization of their communities]

LAMPL, ZSUZSANNA (Konstantin University Faculty of Central-European Studies): A szlovákiai magyar kisebbség gazdasági és kulturális elitje

[Slovakian Hungarian minority's cultural and economical elites]

PAPP Z., ATTILA (IENM HAS): A romániai magyar kisebbség gazdasági és kulturális elitje

[Romanian Hungarian minority's cultural and economical elites]

The project's intended and actual types of costs

Most important costs and explanations of differences in the budget

Types of costs	Intended costs (HUF)	Actual costs (HUF)
Personal costs	8967000	8908343
Costs on materials	20433000	20491657
from it for dissemination	588000	588000
from it for coordination	650000	650000
from it for general costs	2290000	2290000
Costs of immaterial	0	0
Purchase of machines, furnishing, equipments	0	0
Total:	29400000	29400000

Difference is because of changing in employer's contributions and VAT.

Results as economical and societal utility

(on national and international level)

This research collected a nationally and internationally unique database as being widespread and comparable with previous data (from 21 years perspective!).

The impact of the research is increased by the fact, that it has been the first comparative investigation between representatives of elite of Hungary's minorities, the Hungarian Slovakian and Romanian minorities, and the Hungarian elite.

This research commands big interest in both national, international scientific life and general public. The conference on 7th December 2010 was followed by wide media-attention, which helps to spread the result of the research extensively.

Project closing evaluative sheet

Short summary of project's results (max. 1500 characters)

After 1990 research of elite was an honored topic of sociology, but the study of 2009 is especially informative, because it is providing information from a period of crisis about the constitution of elite's forming, behavior, values, lifestyle, political preferences, identity, reputation. Grounded on the results it is analyzable whether elites are capable of coping and managing the crisis.

The elite's answer of the crisis is closing down and the endeavor of monopolizing the disposition above the resources of developing. The elite's reaction is a structural phenomenon. One of the reasons of dysfunctional political institutions and political parties is that elite's strategies are led by such demands on total power and organizing and leading the society, which are already exceeded by the society.

This research collected a nationally and internationally unique database of information as being widespread and comparable with previous data.

The importance of the research is increased by the fact that it has been the first time to make a comparative research on Hungary's minorities' elites and Slovakian and Romanian national minorities' elites.

Evaluation of the project (max. 1500 characters)

In 2009 and 2010 we found 3568 persons representing the elite. Interviews were taken with the representatives of political elite (401), economical elite (438), cultural elite (501), Hungary's minorities' (German, Roma, Slovakian, Romanian) elite (522), Hungarian Slovakian economical (398) and cultural (395) elite, Hungarian Romanian economical (407) and cultural (506) elite.

Apart from the results this project is a good example of cooperation between academic research institutes.

Based on the research results one PhD thesis was written by Luca Kristóf, with the tutoring of Imre Kovách.

From the results it has already been a scientific conference organized in Hungary and a book of essays will be published in February 2011 (at Argumentum Publishing House, mutual edition of Institute for Political Science and Research Institute of Ethnic and National Minorities at Hungarian Academy of Sciences).

From the results it is going to be other presentations held on national and international conferences, and we plan to publish further books in English and in Hungarian.

28. January 2011.

Dr. Kovách, Imre
Leader of the Consortium